Time: 15:47hrs
Date: 2nd September 2006
Location: Kandahar airspace (Afghanistan)
Last known action: Air-to-Air Refuelling
Immediately following a routine air-to-air refuelling (15:30hrs) XV230 a Nimrod MR2 from 120Sqn RAF Kinloss suffered a fire within the Bomb bay (15:41hrs) minutes later a second fire spread throughout the fuselage (15:46hrs) before XV230 exploded (15:47hrs) immediately killing all 12 crew and 2 passengers:
May they be at peace with their Creator
Flight Lieutenant Allan James Squires, 39, from Clatterbridge (Pilot and Captain)
Flight Lieutenant Steven Johnson, 38, from Collingham, Notts. (Weapon System Officer (Navigator))
Flight Lieutenant Gareth Rodney Nicholas, 40, from Redruth, Cornwall (Weapons Systems Officer (Air Electronics Officer))
Flight Lieutenant Steven Swarbrick, 28, from Liverpool (Pilot)
Flight Lieutenant Leigh Anthony Mitchelmore, 28, from Bournemouth (Weapon System Officer (Navigator))
Flight Sergeant Adrian Davies, 49, from Amersham, Bucks. (Air Engineer)
Flight Sergeant Gary Wayne Andrews, 48, from Tankerton, Kent (Weapon System Operator)
Flight Sergeant Gerard Martin Bell, 48, from Ely, Cambs. (Weapon System Operator)
Flight Sergeant Stephen Beattie, 42, from Dundee (Weapons Systems Operator)
Sergeant Gary Paul Quilliam, 42, from Manchester (Weapons Systems Operator)
Sergeant Benjamin James Knight, 25, from Bridgewater (Weapons Systems Operator)
Sergeant John Joseph Langton, 29, from Liverpool (Weapons Systems Operator)
Marine Joseph David Windall, aged 22, Royal Marines
Corporal Oliver Simon Dicketts, 27, Parachute Regiment
Why am I choosing to write this now?
Today, finally, the results of an independent review into the tragedy carried out by Charles Haddon-Cave QC will be published.
We already know that following an inquest in 2008, a coroner ruled that a serious design flaw in the ageing aircraft meant the entire Nimrod fleet was unsafe to fly and it never had been airworthy [causes of the accident listed at foot of post]
Why am I overly concerned? Because this time it’s personal!
When you read the list of names above that is probably all it is to you, a list.
To me it is a walk down memory lane.
I can count at least 3 on the list that I call friends.
I can count 12 on the list who would come into my office on a daily basis to collect certain equipment to allow them to do their job.
I can count 5 on the list who I have served overseas with on Operations. Furthermore, I have flown in XV230 on a number of occasions courtesy of 120Sqn.
Every name on the list was and in my opinion still is a professional. Doing the job they chose, the job they loved and I can assure you they all had a great time doing what they loved.
The crew knew the state of the aircraft, the RAF knew the state of the Nimrod fleet, we all knew but it was still damned good at its job so it kept on doing it.
I am proud to say I served the Nimrod fleet on my penultimate tour within the RAF towards the end of 24 years service and it was one of the best times I had.
You can be assured that I shall be reading the findings this afternoon with a little more interest than most and hoping that it goes someway to comforting the families and loved ones of my friends and colleagues.
RIP.
CAUSES:
As the Board was unable to investigate XV230’s wreckage at the crash site and it proved impossible to recover more than a few small components from the aircraft, the Board has been unable to determine positively the source or cause of the fire which led to the loss of XV230 and its crew. Nonetheless, through investigation of the limited data available, the Board was able to deduce the most probable location of the fire, a number of probable causes of that event and factors which possibly contributed to it:
a. The escape of fuel during AAR, occasioned by an overflow from No 1 tank, or a leak from the fuel system (fuel coupling or pipe), led to an accumulation of fuel within the No 7 tank dry bay. Although of a lower probability, the fuel leak could have been caused by a hot air leak damaging fuel system seals.
b. The ignition of that fuel following contact with an exposed element of the aircraft’s crossfeed/ SCP pipe work.
CONTRIBUTORY FACTORS:
a. The age of the Nimrod MR2’s non-structural system components.
b. Nimrod MR2 maintenance policy in relation to fuel and hot air systems.
c. The lack of a fire detection and suppression system within the No 7 tank dry bay.
d. The fact that hazard analysis did not correctly categorize the potential threat to the aircraft caused by the collocation of fuel and hot air system components within the No 7 tank dry bay.
e. The formal incorporation of AAR capability within the Nimrod did not identify the full implications of successive changes to the fuel system and associated procedures.
AGGRAVATING FACTOR:
a. The loss of flying controls through fire damage to the hydraulic systems or cables and pulleys.